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Abstract—Massive multiple antenna systems in con-
junction with millimeter (mmWave) communication have
gained tremendous attention in the recent years owing
to their high speed data delivery. However, security in
these networks has been overlooked; thereby necessitating
a comprehensive study. This paper analyzes the physical
layer security performance of the downlink of a massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)-based hybrid het-
erogeneous network (HetNet) where both mmWave and
sub-6 GHz small cells coexist. Specifically, a tractable
approach using stochastic geometry is proposed to analyze
the secrecy outage probability, secrecy energy efficiency
(SEE) and secrecy spectrum efficiency (SSE) of the hy-
brid HetNets. Our study further characterizes the impact
of large antenna arrays, directional beamforming gains,
transmit power, and cell density on the above mentioned
secrecy performance measures. The results show that at
low transmit power operation, the secrecy performance
enhances for higher small cell density. It has also been
observed that the higher directivity gains at mmWave cells
lead to a drop in secrecy performance of the network; thus
a tradeoff exists between better coverage or secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to the widespread usage of intelligent de-
vices and exponential growth in wireless data traffic,
the conventional sub-6 GHz communication ways
are almost saturated and are incapable of meeting
the increase in traffic demands. New access tech-
nologies under the umbrella of fifth generation (5G)
communications are gearing up in both academia as
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well as industry. The key enablers for 5G networks
at the physical layer include heterogeneous cellu-
lar networks (HetNets) with massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) technology and millimeter
wave (mmWave) communication at 10 to 300 GHz
radio frequency bands with bandwidths as high
as 2 GHz [2]–[4]. The HetNets create a layer of
overlay deployment of small cells of low-powered
base stations (BS), variable communication ranges,
and operating frequencies on the existing sub-6 GHz
macro cells thus providing enhanced coverage and
throughput to the end users by bringing network
closer to them [5].
Massive MIMO technologies produce highly di-
rectional beam gains and enhanced radio spectral ef-
ficiency in HetNets by deploying large-scale antenna
arrays at the transmitting nodes. On the other hand,
mmWave communication, takes place at a smaller
wavelength than the conventional microwave net-
works, provides higher spectral efficiency while be-
ing sensitive to blockages and certain materials such
as concrete cause severe propagation losses and
thereby higher path loss which limits the coverage
size of mmWave cells. Because of the mmWave
small wavelength, a large number of antennas can
be deployed in a small area. Using these directional
antenna arrays, beamforming can be implemented
at mmWave BSs to compensate for path loss since
measurements show significant differences in line-
of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) path
loss properties [4], [6]. Beamforming gains also tend
to overcome the additional noise power and out-of-
cell interference in mmWave communication [7].
While talking about 5G communications, the
main focus is on maximizing the coverage proba-
bility and achievable rate at the end user. However,
the idea of end user’s information integrity and
secrecy is equally important and it presents the
gap in recent studies, which is investigated in this
study. Physical layer security (PLS) can be a less
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complex solution for the protection of confiden-
tial information in complex wireless networks [8].
Particularly, PLS in massive MIMO-enabled hybrid
HetNets with mmWave small cells is important
since the aforementioned networks present the most
common deployment scenario for the future 5G
communication networks. This paper analyses the
PLS in massive MIMO-enabled hybrid HetNets
by digging into unique advantageous properties of
massive MIMO and mmWave channel.
A. Related Works and Motivation
Major research developments have been made
recently in the area of PLS for wireless networks
where the secrecy outage probability and secrecy
rate are the important tools of investigation. The
effects of fading on secrecy outage probability,
which is the probability that the confidentiality of
information sent to legitimate receiver has been
compromised, is studied in [9], [10]. Techniques
such as cooperative jamming, Wyner codes, beam-
forming, and artificial noise can improve the secrecy
by degrading eavesdropper’s channel as investi-
gated in [8], [12]. Spectrum allocation and transmit
beamforming are designed for a two-tier HetNet
to improve secrecy rate in [13]. The stochastic
modeling of secrecy outage probability and network
throughput of a HetNet is studied in [14]. An access
threshold-based secrecy mobile association policy
for a K-tier HetNet is proposed in [15]. The authors
in [16] studied secure transmission based on coor-
dinated multipoint scheme in HetNets. The secrecy
rate and energy efficiency in massive MIMO-based
heterogeneous centralized radio access network (C-
RAN) is analyzed in [17] where it is shown that
the centralized and distributed large-scale antenna
systems collectively contribute to improved secrecy.
Authors investigate the artificial noise aided physi-
cal layer security in massive MIMO multiple access
channels where legitimate users and eavesdoppers
have large antenna arrays and derive use insights
[40].
All of the aforementioned literature focuses on
PLS analysis of HetNets based on conventional sub-
6 GHz low frequency tiers. Since the propagation
properties of mmWave communication are different
from sub-6 GHz channels, traditional studies and
results in PLS do not necessarily apply to mmWave
communication systems. For instance, secrecy be-
havior of a point-to-point mmWave link is stud-
ied in [18], which shows that mmWave has an
enhanced secrecy in contrast to sub-6 GHz con-
ventional systems. The large available bandwidth
at mmWave frequencies and large-scale antenna
arrays providing high directivity gain can pave the
way for high speed secure links achievable [18].
In [19], the authors have investigated the impact
of blockages on the secrecy rate in a network with
both mmWave and sub-6 GHz BSs in the presence
of eavesdroppers. Secrecy outage probability for
mmWave network is analyzed when the users and
eavesdropping nodes are single antenna omnidirec-
tional transceivers in [20]. In [21], mmWave secrecy
beamforming schemes are proposed to maximize the
secrecy sum rate in two-way amplify-and-forward
MIMO relaying networks. Physical layer security in
large-scale mmWave ad hoc networks is analyzed in
[22] where it is assumed that the eavesdroppers are
randomly located and can intercept the confidential
information if they reside in a single beam. We
would like to highlight that the aforementioned
work in the recent literature solely focuses on
the secrecy outage analysis of mmWave cellular
networks only or mmWave overlaid sub-6 GHz
networks. According to the best of our knowledge,
there is no analytical work in the literature which
investigates the secrecy spectrum efficiency (SSE)
and secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) for massive
MIMO-enabled hybrid HetNets incorporating both
sub-6 GHz and mmWave small cells in the presence
of eavesdroppers.
B. Approach and Contributions
This paper studies the PLS in proposed three tier
hybrid HetNet with massive MIMO in macro tier
and sub-6 GHz and mmWave frequency small cells.
We propose a tractable approach for SSE and SEE
analysis that accounts for the key features of mas-
sive MIMO technology, mmWave channel, number
of transmitting antennas, beamforming gains and
node densities. The main contributions and insights
are listed as follows.
• We model the proposed downlink of a three
tier hybrid HetNet with massive MIMO-
enabled macro tier incorporating sub-6 GHz
and mmWave frequency small cells with the
aid of stochastic geometry, which characterizes
the random spatial distributions of transmitting
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BSs, legitimate users and eavesdroppers. The
secrecy outage probability for each of three
tiers is derived to quantify the effects of impor-
tant system parameters. Our results show that
at high antenna gains, secrecy outage of the
network increases and a tradeoff exists between
enhanced coverage or secrecy performance.
With increased number of antennas at massive
MIMO-enabled Macro BSs (MBSs), secrecy
performance of the network decreases.
• We develop an analytical tractable framework
for the evaluation of average achievable ergodic
rate for each of three tiers and eavesdroppers
to determine average achievable secrecy rate
of the network. Based on average achievable
secrecy rate, the secrecy oriented spectrum and
energy efficiency performance of the massive
MIMO-enabled three tier hybrid HetNet is de-
rived. Our results demonstrate that increasing
the number of antennas at MBSs results in
a drop in SSE and SEE of the network. By
increasing the transmit power of small cell BSs,
SSE and SEE of the network improve.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider the time-division duplex
(TDD)-based downlink transmission scheme in a
hybrid HetNet where spatially distributed access
points (or BSs) transmit the information to the
legitimate users in the presence of multiple mali-
cious eavesdroppers. The macro cells operating at
sub-6 GHz constitute tier 1, whereas small cells
operating at sub-6 GHz and small cells operating at
mmWave band constitute tier 2 and 3, respectively.
It is assumed that the location of BSs follow a two
dimensional homogeneous Poisson point process
(HPPP) with intensity Φk and density λk where
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Similarly, the location of legitimate
users and eavesdroppers are modeled as HPPP with
intensity Φu and its density λu and Φe with den-
sity λe, respectively. It is assumed that the MBSs
are provided with multiple antennas forming an
array while the small cell BSs, legitimate users
and eavesdroppers are equipped with a single omni-
directional antenna. Massive MIMO is adopted at
the macro cells such that each MBS has N antennas
that can communicate simultaneously with U users
(N  U ≥ 1) with equal power distribution among
all users [23].
In this work, we assume perfect synchroniza-
tion and downlink channel state information (CSI)
is known at the MBS and focus on zero-forcing
precoding. Because in the practical TDD massive
MIMO systems, the downlink CSI can be obtained
through channel reciprocity based on uplink train-
ing. The main focus of this work is to carry out the
detailed performance analysis of massive MIMO-
enabled three-tier hybrid heterogeneous networks
for the perfectly estimated CSI case. The imper-
fect CSI or outdated CSI can adversely affect the
system performance [24]- [25] and its impact on
the performance analysis is not main scope of this
work. It is assumed that each MBS uses linear
zero forcing beamforming (ZFBF) to transmit U
data streams with equal power assignment [26]. In
the kth tier, each BS has the total transmit power
Pk and path loss exponent αk. In accordance with
Slivnyak’s Theorem, the analysis of the network is
performed for a typical user located at the origin and
an open access scheme is assumed where the user
can connect to any tier BS based on the maximum
average received power.
A. Received Signal Power Model
1) mmWave network
In mmWave networks, since mmWave signals are
transmitted with narrow beamwidths, therefore, the
effects of multipath fading is not that severe as the
delay spread of the channel is small. It is also clearly
outlined in [2, 5] that the small-scale fading can be
ignored in the analysis carried out for the mmWave
network. For an analytical tractability, in this work
the Nakagami fading model is considered. Using the
Nakagami fading model, the envelope of the fading
has the probability density function (PDF) given as
|h| ∼ f|h| (y,Nq) , N
Nq
q yNq−1 exp{−Nqy}
Γ (Nq)
, ∀y > 0,
(1)
where Nq is the Nakagami fading parameter wherein
q ∈ {Lm, Nm} and Γ (Nq) is the gamma function.
Here Lm and Nm represent the LoS and NLoS prop-
agation environments, respectively, and the Nak-
agami parameter is characterized for each environ-
ment differently. In the assumed system model, the
small scale fading between the mmWave small cell
BS and the typical user is considered to be in-
dependent Nakagami fading with Nakagami fading
parameter NLm and NNm for LoS and NLoS links,
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respectively. Both NLm and NNm are considered as
positive integers for the ease of tractability.
We perform our analysis on a typical outdoor
user where a typical user at the origin O is LoS
to the mmWave small cell at A if and only if
there is no blockage intersecting the link OA. By
employing independent thinning theorem, Φ3 is di-
vided into ΦLm3 and Φ
Nm
3 = Φ3/Φ
Lm
3 using LoS
probability function, p(x), as independent PPPs of
LoS and NLoS mmWave small cells, respectively
[27]. Thus, ΦLm3 and Φ
Nm
3 have the densities p(x)λ3
and (1− p(x))λ3, respectively. The LoS probability
function, p(x), is a measure of probability that a link
of length x is LoS while NLoS probability of a link
is 1−p(x). The LoS probability function p(x) can be
obtained by field measurements or from stochastic
blockage models. Using stochastic blockage models,
p(x) is defined as, p(t) = e−βx where β is the
dependent on statistics of blockages and x is the
link distance between the serving BS and the typical
user.
The mmWave tier BSs use directional beamform-
ing for data transmission for compensating the no-
table path loss at mmWave frequencies. The antenna
pattern is approximated using a sectored model,
where the array gains are assumed to be constant for
all angles in the main lobe and another constant in
the side lobe. Beam direction is assumed to be inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed between (0, 2pi].
Hence, the effective antenna gain distribution, GT,R,
at a typical receiver, r, for an interferer, t, is given
as,
GT,R =

MrMt with prob.
θrθt
4pi2
Mrmt with prob.
θr (2pi − θt)
4pi2
mrMt with prob.
(2pi − θr) θt
4pi2
mrmt with prob.
(2pi − θr) (2pi − θt)
4pi2
,
(2)
where Mj is the main lobe gain with beamwidth
θj , mj donates the side lobe gain and θj is the
half power beamwidth (or 3-dB beamwidth where
j ∈ {t, r} ). We assume that the typical transmitting
BS, t, and receiver, r, are perfectly aligned thus
maximum directivity gain MrMt can be achieved.
Likewise, the antenna gain seen at the eavesdropper
e ∈ {EV1, EV2, · · · , EVE}1 from serving BS, t, is
1E is the total number of eavesdroppers
defined as
GT,e =

MeMt with prob.
θeθt
4pi2
Memt with prob.
θe (2pi − θt)
4pi2
meMt with prob.
(2pi − θe) θt
4pi2
memt with prob.
(2pi − θe) (2pi − θt)
4pi2
,
(3)
where Me, me and θe are the main lobe gain, half
power beamwidth and the side lobe gain at the
eavesdropper e, respectively.
2) Sub-6 GHz network
The channel modeling in the sub-6 GHz network
can be formulated in a similar manner to that of
the mmWave network with the exception that the
antennas in sub-6 GHz BSs are omni-directional
with the transmission power of Pi with the path
loss exponent αi,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that the
Macro BS operating at sub-6 GHz are equipped
with N antennas whereas Small cell BS operating
at sub-6 GHz are equipped with a single antenna,
i.e., N = 1. It is important to highlight that for
the sub-6 GHz network, h is assumed to be inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit
variance, which is the same as assuming the fading
to be Nakagami with Nq = 1. An i.i.d Rayleigh
fading channel is considered for the massive MIMO
enabled macrocell BS and small cell BS operating
at sub-6 GHz band with the typical user. It is worth-
while to mention that for single input single output
(SISO) transmission (for the case of sub-6 GHz
small cells tier or tier 2), there is no precoding and
the channel gain for the both interfering and direct
link follow exp (1) distribution which is same as
Γ (1, 1) distribution. If the desired link is established
between the transmitter and receiver, GT,R = GuGk
where Gu is user’s gain and G(.) denotes the main
lobe gain for k ∈ {1, 2}. It is also important to
highlight that the effective antenna gain GT,R for the
sub-6 GHz links are not affected by the half-power
beamwidth and the side lobe gain. As the legitimate
users (or eavesdroppers) are equipped with a single
omni-directional antenna so the effective antenna
gain Gu (or Ge) is equal to 1, GT,R = Gk.
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B. Downlink User Association
In this work, it is assumed that the legitimate user
connects to the BS that provides maximum average
received power [28]. Thus, the typical user located
at the origin will connect to tier j only if
j = arg max
k∈{1,2,3}
CkPkGT,Rx
−αk
= arg max
k∈{1,2,3}
PkGT,Rx
−αk ,
where the normalized transmission power of the kth
tier is given by Pk = Ck × Pk = Pk
(4pi
λc
)2
. λc is
the carrier wavelength corresponding to the carrier
frequency fc, Ck is the frequency dependent path
loss at a reference distance of 1m given by
(
λc
4pi
)2
and the path loss between typical user and serving
BS for the separating distance x is given by x−αk .
The average received power for a user establish-
ing connection with the MBS, M (from Φ1 or tier
1) denoted by P avg1 can be expressed as,
P avg1 = GM
P1
U
x−α1 , (4)
where GM is the antenna array gain expressed as
(N − U + 1) for ZFBF transmission [26]. Using
the orthogonality property of ZFBF, each user is
provided with the same number of spatial degrees
of freedom given by (N − U + 1). The average
received power for a user establishing connection
with small cell BS can be expressed as,
P avgl = PlGlx
−αl , where l ∈ {2, 3}, (5)
where Gl can be defined as follow:
Gl =
{
1, sub-6 GHz small cell,
GT,R, defined in (2), mmWave small cell.
C. Signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR)
Model
In this subsection, we analyze SINR of the
considered three tier HetNet. It is observed that
the secrecy performance improves manyfolds when
the eavesdropper channel is distorted because of
interference. It is important to highlight that the
eavesdroppers are the users who are acting mali-
cious. It is also important to note that the sub-6
GHz users operate at lower frequency with higher
wavelength which makes it infeasible to equip the
users (eavesdropper or legitimate users) with more
than one antenna. For a fair comparison, it is
assumed that all the users are equipped with a
single antenna. In this work, we have also assumed
that the eavesdropper acts on its own which means
they do not cooperate with each other, i.e., the
SINR for the eavesdropper is coming from the most
malicious user. This assumption also validates that
each eavesdropper has only one antenna.
The received SINR between a typical receiver and
any eavesdropper2 establishing a connection with
the serving MBS, where M ∈ Φˆ1 can be expressed
as
SINRoM =
P1
U
|ho,Mωo|2GMx−α1
σ2 +
∑
v∈Φ1
P1
U
|hv,Mωv|2Gvx−α1v + IS
,
(6)
SINRe
∗
M =
P1
U
|he,Mωe|2Gex−α1e
σ2 +
∑
v∈Φ1
P1
U
|hv,Mωv|2Gvx−α1v,e + IS
,
(7)
where ho,v =
[
h1o,v, · · · , hNo,v
] ∈ C1×N is the down-
link channel between the vth sub-6 GHz MBS to
the typical user with the subscript o. Each entry
in ho,v is independently identically distributed (iid)
complex gaussian random variable with zero mean
and unit variance. The separate encoding scheme
is considered at each MBS, vth MBS sends an
information symbol via a linear ZFBF vector ωv =[
ω1v , · · · , ωNv
]
with unit norm, i.e., ||ωv|| = 1, v ∈
Φ1,where Φ1 is the set of interfering BSs, i.e.,
interference from all other macrocell BSs excluding
the serving macrocell BS such that Φˆ1 ∪ Φ1 = Φ1
and N << ∞ is the number of antennas at vth
MBS. IS is the inter cell interference from the
small cell operating in sub-6 GHz band given by∑
s∈Φ2 P2|hs|2x−α2s . hs, hv,M , ho,M are the small
2There is a possibility that all or several eavesdroppers can
cooperate with each other by combining their observations forwarded
to the central entity to decode the message of the legitimate user.
This cooperation among the eavesdroppers can result in a group of
cooperating eavesdroppers, i.e., |Ue| resulting in a powerful user with
an access to Ue antennas whose aggregate received power is the
summation of the received power on all the antennas leading to the
maximum secrecy outage. This cooperating mechanism is mentioned
here for the sake of completeness, but it is not the main focus of
this work. It is also assumed that the eavesdropping channels and
legitimate user channels are independent of each other, thus the
eavesdropper with the highest received SINR is the most malicious
one and it dominates the secrecy rate. Therefore, the SINRs discussed
in this subsection are for the most malicious eavesdropper, i.e.,
SINRe
∗
i = max
e∈Φe
{SINRei} where i ∈ {M,S,m}.
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scale fading gains at the typical user from the
interfering channel such that hs ∼ exp(1), from
the interfering MBS such that hv,M ∼ Γ(U, 1) and
from serving MBS for U users such that ho,M ∼
Γ(N − U + 1, 1) [26]. Here, the fading gain at
eavesdropper at the separation distance xe from the
serving BS is denoted by he,M ∼ exp(1). Similarly,
xs and xv are the distances measured from the
typical user to small cell BS s ∈ Φ2 and from the
typical user to MBS v ∈ Φ1, and σ2 is the thermal
noise.
The received SINR between a typical user and
any eavesdropper at separation distance xe estab-
lishing connection with the small cell BS operating
at sub-6 GHz band, where S ∈ Φ2 can be defined
as
SINRoS =
P2|ho,S|2x−α2
σ2 +
∑
s∈Φ2P2|hs,S|2x−α2s + IM
, (8)
SINRe
∗
S =
P2|he,S|2x−α2e
σ2 +
∑
s∈Φ2P2|hs,S|2x−α2s,e + IM
, (9)
where IM is the intercell interference from macro
cells given by
∑
v∈Φ1
P1
U
|hv|2x−α1v . Here, hs,S , ho,S ,
he,S and hv are the small scale fading gain from the
interfering channel such that hs,S ∼ exp(1), ho,S ∼
exp(1), he,S ∼ exp(1) and hv ∼ Γ(U, 1). Here, xs
and xv are the distance measured of the typical user
from small cell BS s and MBS v, respectively.
The received SINR between the typical user
and any eavesdropper establishing connection with
mmWave small cell denoted by bo,m can be ex-
pressed as
SINRom =
P3MrMt|ho,m|2x−α
(q)
3
σ2 + P3
∑
q∈{Lm,Nm}
∑
l∈Φq3Gl|hl,m|2x
−α(q)3
l
,
(10)
SINRe
∗
m =
P3Ge|he,m|2x−α
(q)
3
e
σ2 + P3
∑
q∈{Lm,Nm}
∑
l∈Φq3Gl|hl,m|2x
−α(q)3
l,e
,
(11)
where ho,m and he,m are small scale fading gain, Gl
and Ge are the directivity gains of interfering BSs,
given by (2) and (3) and q ∈ {Lm, Nm} identifies
the interfering link as either LoS (L) or NLoS (N),
respectively.
D. Power Consumption Model
The total power consumption at MBS in each
channel is given by
P total1 = ρ1 +
P1
1
+
3∑
t=1
(U)t(∆t +NΛt), (12)
where ρ1 is load independent circuit power or static
hardware power consumption of MBS, 1 is power
amplifier efficiency, parameters ∆t and Λt depend
on transceiver chains, coding, decoding and precod-
ing [29].
The total power consumption in small cells of tier
2 and tier 3 is given by
P totall = ρl +
Pl
l
for l ∈ {2, 3}, (13)
where ρl is load independent circuit power of SBS,
l ∈ {2, 3} and l is power amplifier efficiency of the
small cell BS of the l-th tier.
E. Secure Transmission Characterization
In this proposed network scenario, it is assumed
that all tier links are eavesdropped. We consider the
case of passive eavesdropping where eavesdroppers
do not perform any active attacks to deteriorate
downlink transmission information. To protect the
confidential information from intrusion, a secrecy
coding scheme called Wyner code is adopted at each
link such that each BS encodes its data using Wyner
coding scheme before transmission [30]. Based on
this scheme, two kinds of code rates need to be
specified before data transmission at the transmitter,
i.e., the rate of the transmitted confidential message
signal Rm, and rate of transmitted code words
Rc where the cost of maintaining the confidential
message secrecy is Rc − Rm [30]. We assume that
rates Rc and Rm remain fixed during information
transmission [31], [32]. Depending on the choice of
Rm and Rc at the BS, the secrecy outage events
may occur and due to quasi-static channel it is not
possible to ensure perfect secrecy.
In order to prevent the secrecy outage event, the
wiretapping capacity of the channel between the
serving BS and eavesdropper Re should be less than
the rate Rc − Rm, meaning that the received SINR
at any eavesdropper is above a certain threshold. In
this trend, the secrecy outage probability is defined
as P kso(γe) = Pr(SINR
e
k > γe). SSE is the measure
of the average secrecy rate per unit bandwidth
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and it is used to define the spectrum efficiency
in terms of secrecy measure in a 3-tier massive
MIMO enabled hybrid HetNet. SEE is defined as
the secrecy performance of a 3-tier massive MIMO
enabled hybrid HetNet achieved with unit energy
consumption.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The secrecy transmission capacity constraint is
defined as the average achievable rate of successful
transmission of confidential information [30], [33].
In the proposed 3-tier massive MIMO-enabled hy-
brid HetNet, the average achievable secrecy rate for
each tier k is defined as
RSk = [Rk −Rek]+ for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (14)
where Rk = E[log2(1 + SINR
u
k)] is the average
achievable ergodic rate of the channel between the
serving base station of tier k and the typical receiver
node, Rek = E[log2(1 + SINR
e∗
k )] is the average
achievable ergodic rate of the channel between the
serving base station and most malicious eavesdrop-
per and [y]+ = max{0, y}.
Since the eavesdropper nodes are non-colluding,
i.e., they intercept the confidential information mes-
sage passively without actively intruding the trans-
mission, the CSI of eavesdropper node is unknown
at the serving BS. Thus the ergodic transmission
rate of the serving BS is only dependent on the CSI
of the link between itself and legitimate intended
receiver. In this work, we considered the case of
most malicious eavesdropper, hence, the average
achievable ergodic rate in a random wiretap channel
cannot exceed Rek.
A. Achievable Ergodic Rate
Using the mathematical notations defined in (14),
we first derive the achievable ergodic rate at the
intended legitimate user as follows.
Lemma 1: When the legitimate typical user is
associated with MBS, the exact achievable average
ergodic rate between the serving BS and the most
malicious eavesdropper is given by [39, Theorem
3] [38]
Re1 = Pr (R
e
1 > γe)
= Pr
[
log2 (1 + SINR
e
M) > γe
]
,
Re1 = Pr (SINR
e
M > 2
γe − 1) ,
Re1 =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
Pr (SINReM > e
γe − 1),
Re1 =
1
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
P 1C (γe)
1 + γe
dγe,
Re1 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
1− P 1so(γe)
1 + γe
dγe, (15)
where P 1so(γe) is CDF of SINR
e∗
M given as,
P 1so(γe) = 1− exp
(
−2piλe
N∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
(−1)i+1×∫ ∞
0
reexp
[
−iγer
α1
e σ
2
Pˆ1
− ζ11 − ζ12
]
dre
)
,
(16)
where Pˆ1 = P1U , ζ
1
1 and ζ
1
2 are given as,
ζ11 = 2piλ1
U∑
c=1
(
U
c
)∫ ∞
re
(uPˆ1r
−α1)
c
(1 + uPˆ1r−α1)
U
rdr
and
ζ12 = 2piλ2
∫ ∞
(
P2
(N−U+1)Pˆ1
)
1
α2 re
α1
α2
(
uP2r
−α2
1 + uP2r−α2
)
rdr,
where u = ( iγere
α1
Pˆ1
).
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix
B.
Lemma 2: The achievable ergodic rate at the
intended legitimate user associated with MBS is
given by
R1 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
P 1C(γ)
1 + γ
dγ, (17)
where P 1C(γ) =
∫∞
0
P 1C(γ, x)fX1(x)dx is the
complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of SINRuM . Here, fX1(x) is the probability
density function (PDF) of the distance between the
serving MBS and typical user and P 1C(γ, x) is the
conditional coverage probability for given distance
x between the typical user and serving MBS.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix
C.
By substituting (15) and (17) in (14), we can
finally calculate the average achievable secrecy rate
for sub-6 GHz macro tier.
Lemma 3:The achievable ergodic rate at the in-
tended legitimate user establishing connection with
sub-6 GHz small cell BS can be expressed as
R2 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
P 2C(γ)
1 + γ
dγ, (18)
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where P 2C(γ) =
∫∞
0
P 2C(γ, x)fX2(x)dx is the CCDF
of SINRuS . Here, fX2(x) is the PDF of the distance
between the serving sub-6 GHz small cell BS and
typical user and P 2C(γ, x) is the conditional coverage
probability of the typical user. The PDF of distance,
fX2(x), is given as,
fX2(x) =
2piλ2
A2
xexp
(
−piλ2x2 − 2piλ3D(x)−
piλ1
(
P1(N − U + 1)xα2
P2U
)2/α1)
,
(19)
where A2 is the association probability that a user
is connected to sub-6 GHz small cell BS given by
A2 = 2piλ2
∫ ∞
0
xexp
(
−piλ2x2 − 2piλ3D(x)−
piλ1
(
P1(N − U + 1)xα2
P2U
)2/α1)
dx,
(20)
where D(x) is given by (A.4), δN(x) =(
P3G
P2
) 1
αL x
α2
αL and δL(x) =
(
P3G
P2
) 1
αN x
α2
αN .
Conditional coverage probability, P 2C(γ, x), is de-
fined as,
P 2C(γ, x) = exp
(
−γσ
2xα2
P2
− 2piλ1
U∑
z=1
(
U
z
)
(
P1γx
α2
UP2
)z
×
(−γxα2P1
UP2
)
−z+ 2
α1
α1
B(P1γxα2
UP2
(H(x))−1
) [z − 2
α1
, 1− U
]
−
2piλ2γx
α2
x2−α2
α2 − 2 ×2 F1
[
α2 − 2
α2
, 1; 2− 2
α2
;−γ
])
,
(21)
where H(x) =
(
(N−U+1)
UP2
P1x
α2
)
.
Proof: The proof follows on the similar lines
from Lemma 1. However, for better understanding,
readers can follow the proof from Appendix C.
Lemma 4: When the legitimate typical user es-
tablishes connection with sub-6 GHz small cell, the
exact achievable average ergodic rate between the
serving BS and the most malicious eavesdropper is
given by
Re2 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
1− P 2so(γe)
1 + γe
dγe, (22)
where P 2so(γe) is the CDF of SINR
e∗
S given as,
P 2so(γe) = 1− exp
(
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
reexp
[
−γer
α2
e σ
2
P2
−ζ21 − ζ22
]
dre
)
,
(23)
where
ζ21 = 2piλ1
U∑
µ=1
(
U
µ
)
×
∫ ∞
(N−U+1
P2
Pˆ1)
1
α1 re
α2
α1
(uPˆ1r
−α1)
µ
(1 + uPˆ1r−α1)
U
rdr,
ζ22 = 2piλ2
∫ ∞
re
(
uP2r
−α2
1 + uP2r−α2
)
rdr,
where u = (γere
α2
P2
).
Proof: It can be proved by following the approach
used in Lemma 2.
By substituting (18) and (22) in (14), we can
thus calculate the average achievable secrecy rate
for sub-6 GHz small cell tier.
Lemma 5: The achievable ergodic rate at the
intended legitimate user associated with mmWave
small cell BS is given by
R3 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
P 3C(γ)
1 + γ
dγ, (24)
where P 3C(γ) =
∑
q∈{L,N}
A3,qP
3,q
C (γ), is the CCDF of
SINRum, P
3,Lm
C (γ) and P
3,Nm
C (γ) are the conditional
coverage probabilities when the typical user, associ-
ated with mmWave small cell tier, forms a link with
the BS in ΦLm3 and Φ
Nm
3 , A3,q are the probabilities
of typical user connecting with LoS or NLoS link,
respectively.
The conditional coverage probabilities, P 3,qC (γ, x)
can be evaluated by
P 3,qC (γ) =
Nq∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
Nq
j
)
×∫ ∞
0
exp
(−jηqxαqγσ2
MrMt
− Cq,j(γ, x)
)
fq(x)dx,
(25)
where Cq,j(γ, x) is shown at the top of the page in
(27) and (28) where δLm(x) = x
αLm
αNm , δNm(x) =
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x
αNm
αLm , F (Nq, x) = 1 − 1/(1 + x)Nq and ηq =
Nq(Nq!)
− 1
Nq , q ∈ {Lm, Nm}. Parameters aˆi =
ai/MrMt, ai and pi are defined in Section II-A.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix
D.
Remark 1: For the special case of Rayleigh small
scale fading, the conditional coverage probability,
P 3,qC (γ) can be approximated by setting NLm =
NNm = 1 and ηLm = ηNm = 1 as follow:
P 3,qC (γ) =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−jηqxαqγσ2
MrMt
− Cq,j(γ, x)
)
fq(x)dx,
where Cq,j, q ∈ {Lm, Nm} can be approximated
from (33) and (34) by replacing NLm = NNm = 1,
ηLm = ηNm = 1 and F (Nq, x) = 1− 11+x .
Lemma 6: When the legitimate typical user
is associated with mmWave small cell, the exact
achievable average ergodic rate between the serving
BS and the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
Re3 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
1− P 3so(γe)
1 + γe
dγe, (29)
where P 2so(γe) is the CDF of SINR
e∗
m given as,
P 3so(γe) = 1− exp
(
−2piλe
∑
j∈{Lm,Nm}
Nj∑
i=1
(
Nj
i
)
(−1)i+1 ×
∫ ∞
0
reexp
[
−iγer
αj
e σ2
P3Ge
− ζ3,j
]
pj(re)dre
)
,
(30)
where pL(re) = e(−βre) is the LoS probability
function and pN(re) = 1−e(−βre) is the NLoS prob-
ability function for the eavesdropper wiretapping
the transmission from serving mmWave BS to the
intended receiver node. Here, ζ3,Lm = CL,j(γe, re)
and ζ3,Nm = CN,j(γe, re) where CLm,j(γe, re) and
CNm,j(γe, re) can be computed by setting γ = γe
and r = re in (27) and (28), respectively.
Proof: It can be proved by following the approach
used in Lemma 2, separately, for LoS and NLoS
link. By substituting (24) and (29) in (14), we can
thus calculate the average achievable secrecy rate
for mmWave tier.
B. Special Cases
Example 1: By setting N = U = 1, the associa-
tion probability of MBS, sub-6 GHz small cells and
mmWave small cells can be given, respectively, by:
A1 = 2piλ1
∫ ∞
0
xexp
(
−piλ2
(
P2x
α1
P1
)2/α2
−piλ1x2 − 2piλ3
(
P3
P1
)2/α3
D(x)
)
dx,
(31)
A2 = 2piλ2
∫ ∞
0
xexp
(
−piλ2x2 − 2piλ3D(x)
−piλ1
(
P1x
α2
P2
)2/α1)
dx,
(32)
A3,Lm = 2piλ3
∫ ∞
0
xp(x)exp{(−2piλ3M(x)−
Z(x)− Y (x)},
(33)
A3,Nm = 1− A1 − A2 − A3,Lm , (34)
where D(x) is given by (18), Z(x) =
piλ1
(
P1x
αLm
P3
)2/α1
and Y (x) = piλ2
(
P2xα1
P1
)2/α2
.
This change in setting is equal to the previous
result corresponding to the cellular network in [19].
Case 1.1: Similarly, for the case of same path-
loss exponents for all k tiers, i.e., α1 = α2 =
α3,Lm = α3,Nm = α, the association probabilities
and D(x) in (18) can be further simplified as below:
A1 = 2piλ1
∫ ∞
0
xexp
(
−piλ2
(
P2
P1
)2/α
x2
−piλ1x2 − 2piλ3
(
P3
P1
)2/α
D(x)
)
dx,
(35)
A2 = 2piλ2
∫ ∞
0
xexp
(
−piλ2x2 − 2piλ3D(x)
−piλ1
(
P1
P2
)2/α
x2
)
dx,
(36)
A3,Lm = 2piλ3
∫ ∞
0
xp(x)exp{(−2piλ3M(x)
−Z(x)− Y (x)},
(37)
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CLm,j(γ, x) = 2piλ3
∑4
i=1 pi
[∫∞
x
F
(
NLm ,
jηLm aˆiγx
αLm
NLm t
αLm
)
p(t)tdt+
∫∞
δL(x)
F
(
NNm ,
jηLm aˆiγx
αLm
NNm t
αNm
)
(1− p(t))tdt
]
, (27)
CNm,j(γ, x) = 2piλ3
∑4
i=1 pi
[∫∞
δN (x)
F
(
NLm ,
jηNm aˆiγx
αNm
NLm t
αLm
)
p(t)tdt+
∫∞
x
F
(
NNm ,
jηNm aˆiγx
αNm
NNm t
αNm
)
(1− p(t))tdt
]
, (28)
where Z(x) = piλ1
(
P1
P3
)2/α
x2 and Y (x) =
piλ2
(
P2
P1
)2/α
x2.
A3,Nm = 1− A1 − A2 − A3,Lm , (38)
and,
D(x) =
∫ δNm (x)
0
tp(t)dt+
∫ δLm (x)
0
t(1− p(t))dt,
(39)
where δNm(x) =
(
P3G
P1
) 1
α
x, δLm(x) =
(
P3G
P1
) 1
α
x
Example 2: For the special case, when both MBS
and sub-6 GHz small cells operate at different
frequency bands, hence there is no cross-tier inter-
ference, i.e., only co-tier interference from same tier
BSs and all tiers have same path-loss exponent α,
the coverage probability of tier k can be simplified
as follow:
P 1C(γ, x) =
η1∑
l=0
(xα)l
(l!)(−1)l
∑ l!
l∏
j=1
nj!(j!)
nj
×
exp
(
−γσ
2Uxα
P1
− Ξ
(
γUxα
P1
)) l∏
j=1
(Ψ
(j)
((xα))nj ,
(40)
where η1 = N−U . In (40), Ξ(e),Ψ(1)(i) and Ψ(j)(i)
are given by (41), (42) and (43) at the top of the
next page.
Case 2.1: Similarly, P 2C(γ, x) can also be found
by using N = 1 and U = 1 in (28). Similarly,
P 1so (γe) and P
2
so (γe) can also be obtained accord-
ingly.
Example 3: For the mmWave tier operating in
noise limited regime, σ2 >> (IL + IN), the cover-
age probability from Lemma 5 can be expressed as
follow:
P 3C(γ) =
∑
q∈{Lm,Nm}
Nq∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
Nq
j
)
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−jηqxαqγσ2
MrMt
)
fˆq(x)dx,
(44)
by equating Cq,j(γ, x), q ∈ {Lm, Nm} to zero and
fˆq(x) = A3,q × fq(x).
Case 3.1: Similarly, for the case in mmWave tier
when the LoS interference is far more dominant
than the NLoS interference, i.e., ILm >> INm,
the coverage probability from Lemma 5 can be
expressed as follow:
P 3C(γ) =
∑
q∈{Lm,Nm}
Nq∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
Nq
j
)
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−jηqxαqγσ2
MrMt
− Cq,j (γ, x)
)
fˆq(x)dx,
(45)
where
CLm,j(γ, x) = 2piλ3
4∑
i=1
pi×∫ ∞
x
F
(
NLm ,
jηLm aˆiγx
αLm
NLmt
αLm
)
tp(t)dt,
(46)
CNm,j(γ, x) = 2piλ3
4∑
i=1
pi×∫ ∞
x
αNm
αLm
F
(
NLm ,
jηNm aˆiγx
αNm
NLmt
αLm
)
tp(t)dt,
(47)
Case 3.2: Similarly, for the case of dense
mmWave network corresponding to the interference
limited regime, i.e., (ILm + INm) >> σ2, where all
the users would end up having LoS connections
with their mmWave small cell, i.e., INm ≈ 0.
For the dense deployment of mmWave small cells,
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Ξ(e) = 2piλ1
U∑
z=1
(
U
z
)(
P 1
U
)z
ez
((
−eP1
U
)−z+ 2
α
)
B−eP 1
U
x−α

[
z − 2
α
, 1− U
]
, (41)
Ψ
(1)
(i) = −γσ
2U
P1
− 2piλ1Uγ x
2−α
α− 2 2F1
[
α− 2
α
, U + 1; 2− 2
α
;−iγx−α
]
, (42)
Ψ
(j)
(i) = 2piλ1(−γ) 2α (U + j − 1)!
(U − 1)!
(i)−j+
2
α
α
B(−γix−α)
[
j − 2
α
, 1− U − j
]
, (43)
the coverage probability from Lemma 5 can be
expressed as follow:
P 3C(γ) =
NLm∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
NLm
j
)
×∫ ∞
0
exp
(−jηLmxαLmγσ2
MrMt
− CLm,j (γ, x)
)
fˆq(x)dx,
(48)
where
CLm,j(γ, x) = 2piλ3
4∑
i=1
pi×∫ ∞
x
F
(
NLm ,
jηLm aˆiγx
αLm
NLmt
αLm
)
tp(t)dt,
(49)
C. Secrecy Outage Probability
The total secrecy outage probability, Pso, for the
proposed three tier network with massive MIMO
enabled MBS and mmWave small cells, is defined
as
Pso =
3∑
k=1
P ksoAk, (50)
where Ak is the association probability of tier k.
D. Secrecy Spectrum Efficiency
For the proposed 3-tier hybrid HetNet with mas-
sive MIMO in macro tier and mmWave small cells,
using the law of total expectation and from [11],
[15], the tractable lower bound on the SSE is given
by
SSEL =
3∑
k=1
Ak × SSEk, (51)
where SSE1 = U ×RS1 is SSE for massive MIMO
enabled macro tier and SSEk = RSk for k ∈ {2, 3}
is SSE for small cell tiers, respectively. Average
achievable secrecy rate RSk for each tier k is defined
in (14).
E. Secrecy Energy Efficiency
For the sustainable and optimal operation of the
proposed 3-tier hybrid HetNet with massive MIMO
in macro tier and mmWave small cells, theoretical
understanding of SEE and SSE is equally important.
Thus, the SEE for the proposed network is lower
bounded as [23], [36]
SEEL =
3∑
k=1
Ak × SEEk, (52)
where SEE1 = U×RS1P total1 is SEE for massive MIMO
enabled macro tier and SEEk = RSkP totalk
for k ∈ {2, 3}
is SEE for small cell tiers, respectively. Average
achievable secrecy rate RSk for each tier k is defined
in (14).
IV. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the considered simulation setup, a 3-tier Het-
Net is assumed with MBS density λ1 =
1
(5002 × pi) ,
whereas λ2 and λ3 are considered to be multiples
of MBS density. The sub-6 GHz tiers are assumed
to be operating at a carrier frequency of 1 GHz,
10 MHz bandwidth, path loss exponents α1 = 3.5,
α2 = 4 and transmit power P1 = 46 dBm and P2 =
30 dBm, respectively. The density of eavesdropper
is taken as λe = 1× 10−6, unless stated otherwise.
For mmWave tier, the operating frequency is 28
GHz, 100 MHz bandwidth, path loss exponent for
LoS, αL = 2 and for NLoS, αN = 4 and transmit
power P3 = 30 dBm. Nakagami fading parameters
for mmWave tier, NN and NL, are taken as 2 and
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Fig. 1. Secrecy outage probability of the 3-tier network versus γe(dB)
for λ2 = λ3 = 30λ1, N = 5
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability of the 3-tier network as the
function of λe for γe = 40 dB, N = 5
3, respectively. Array gains for all angles in main
lobe are taken as Mr = 10 dB and Mt = 10
dB and for the side lobes mr = −10 dB and
mt = 0 dB. The main lobe beamwidth is taken to be
θr = 90
◦ and θt = 30◦. A noise power σ2 = −90
dBm is taken with a noise figure of 10 dB. The
blockage parameter, β, is 1/β = 141.4 meters
[35]. We assume coefficients of energy efficiency
of power amplifier as 1 = 2 = 3 = 0.38
[23], load independent circuit power as ρ1 = 4
W, ∆1 = 4.8,∆2 = 0,∆3 = 2.08 × 10−8,Λ1 =
1,Λ2 = 9.5 × 10−8 and Λ3 = 6.25 × 10−8 [29].
Load independent circuit power for small cell tiers is
taken as ρ2 = 13.6 W and ρ3 = 13.6 W, respectively
[37]. Monte Carlo simulations are used to validate
the analytical results.
Fig. 1 shows the plot for secrecy outage proba-
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bility, obtained from (50), versus the SINR thresh-
old at the eavesdropper for varying eavesdropper
antenna gains for the mmWave tier. We observe
that the secrecy outage probability decreases with
γe whereas the higher directivity gains causes an
increase in the secrecy outage. An interesting obser-
vation is that with highly directional beamforming
antennas, the secrecy outage increases. This happens
because, although highly directional beamforming
at mmWave tier prompts enhanced coverage proba-
bility at the legitimate users, but the eavesdroppers
nodes will also benefit with having higher gains.
Henceforth, there is a more possibility that their
SINR goes above the predefined threshold limit.
Thus, the confidential information secrecy may be
compromised. The result demonstrates the existence
of a tradeoff pinpointing that it is unrealistic to use
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high directional beams at mmWave BSs to improve
connection outage while overlooking its effect on
secrecy outage. Moreover, analytical results have
been shown to be in close agreement with the
theoretical results.
Fig. 2 shows the effects of the density of eaves-
dropper nodes on the behavior of secrecy outage
probability, obtained using (50), for different small
cell BS densities and directional antenna gains at
the eavesdroppers. We see that by increasing the
eavesdroppers density, the secrecy outage probabil-
ity increases implying that a large number of eaves-
droppers harm the network secrecy. However, the
secrecy of the network increases with an increase
in the small cell BS density. This is due to the
fact that higher small cell density results in higher
overall network interference prompting uncertainty
at any eavesdropper and its SINR falls below the
threshold, i.e., secrecy outage probability improves.
Moreover, by keeping the small cell density fixed,
lower directional antenna gains at the eavesdropper
improves the secrecy capacity of the network trans-
missions. To summarize, the lower directional gain
and increased cell density collectively negates the
possibility of eavesdroppers’ SINR being above the
threshold.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy outage probability,
obtained using (50), versus the threshold for varying
number of antennas at the MBSs. We see that
the secrecy outage probability increases with the
number of antennas at MBS. This is due to the
fact that MBSs have higher transmission power in
contrast to the small cell BSs resulting in better
transmission at legitimate as well as eavesdropper
nodes, therefore, eavesdroppers are more likely to
have SINR well above threshold. Moreover, MBSs
give higher array gains at higher antenna density and
the users are more averse to be offloaded to small
cells. Hence the interference of the network drops
that prompts less uncertainty at the eavesdroppers.
Further, the figure shows that there is no huge
increment in secrecy outage probability after the
number of antennas is increased past a certain limit
due to the fact that the user association with tiers
does not have any significant variation.
Fig. 4 shows the effects of varying small cells BS
density of tier 2 and tier 3 on SSE. We observe that
the SSE of the network increases with the density of
small cells and it decreases slightly when the density
of eavesdropper nodes increases. The SSE of the
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Fig. 5. SEE versus varying small cells BS density as multiple of
MBS density for λ3 = λ2, Ge = 15 dB, N = 30, U = 5
network elevates because with increased small cell
density, the average cell radius decreases and more
users are offloaded to small cells leading to better
transmission to the intended legitimate user. With a
decrease in the cell sizes, the distance between the
intended user and the transmitting nodes decreases
prompting stronger links between them and hence
achieving higher secrecy rate. As for the mmWave
cells, the LoS probability function p(R), is a func-
tion of distance, therefore, when distance decreases,
LoS association probability increases such that the
users are now more likely to form low path loss
LoS links with mmWave BSs than NLoS links. The
association of users with MBSs declines though they
are high power entities but have low BS density than
the small cells. Moreover, interference in the net-
work increases because of super dense transmitting
nodes which is why the increase in eavesdroppers
density has insignificant impact on SSE.
Fig. 5 includes the plots for SEE, given by (52),
versus the small cells density. We observe that with
increasing λ2 and λ3, the SEE also increases. This
can be attributed to the increasing SSE, shown in
Fig. 4, over the identical power consumption. With
increasing λ2 and λ3, more users are offloaded to
small cell BSs that are low power nodes compared
to macro cells BSs. This may lead to a power
efficient network but it comes at small cell BSs
deployment cost. Thus, the elevation of average
achievable secrecy rate leads to improvement of
SEE. As the interference in the network increases
because of super dense transmitting nodes, there-
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fore, an increase in eavesdroppers density has no
prominent effect on SEE.
Fig. 6 shows the effects of number of transmitting
antennas at the MBS on the SSE of the proposed
three tier network over different small cell densities.
We see that the network SSE drops with increasing
number of transmitters at MBSs and it improves
significantly with increased small cell density. This
occurs because with increased N , radio spectral
efficiency of MBSs increases but since MBSs have
higher transmission power in contrast to small cell
BSs therefore transmission to eavesdropper nodes
in the network improves significantly that elevates
Re. Moreover, with increase in number of antennas
at MBSs, cell association gets biased towards them
because of their high array gains, and few users
connect with BSs of sub-6 GHz and mmWave
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Fig. 9. SEE versus transmit power of small cells BSs for P3 = P2,
Ge = 15 dB, U = 5, N = 30
small cells. In this way the overall interference in
the network drops leading to better reception at
eavesdropper nodes.
In Fig. 7, we see the variation in SEE of the
network given by (52) with increasing number of
antennas at MBSs and we observe that with increas-
ing N , SEE declines. This is due to the fact that SSE
decreases over the identical power consumption,
as shown in Fig. 6. With increase in transmitting
nodes at MBSs, less users are offloaded to small
cells. Since MBSs have higher transmission power
as compared to the small cell BSs leading to a
power inefficient network. Thus SEE drops with the
elevation of average achievable rate at eavesdropper
nodes. Interference in the network increases with
small cell density that leads to drop in Re thus SEE
improves with it.
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Fig. 8 shows the effects of transmitting power of
small cell BSs on the SSE of the assumed three
tier network over different small cell densities. It is
observed that the SSE of the network improves with
the small cells BSs transmit power and improvement
becomes more significant as the small cell BSs
density is increased. The reason is that since small
cells have smaller coverage area, associated users
are located at distance closer to BSs, therefore
when BSs transmit power is increased, they get to
deliver stronger signal strength with low path loss
to the associated users that enhances the average
achievable rate of the legitimate users. This results
in significant enhancement of secrecy rate of the
entire network. Average distance between transmit-
ting and receiver nodes decreases when small cells
become more dense that enhances the transmission
rate between them. This justifies the increase in SSE
with increase in small cell density.
In Fig. 9, we see the variation in SEE of the
network given by (52) with increasing transmit
power of small cell BSs and we observe that with
increasing P2 and P3, SEE inclines. This can be
attributed to the increase in SSE over the identical
power consumption, as shown in Fig. 8. Since small
cells BSs are lower power nodes compared to MBSs
therefore, this prompts a power efficient network.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, considering the unique features of
massive MIMO and mmWave communication, we
concentrated on characterizing the secure commu-
nication in massive MIMO-enabled three tier hybrid
HetNet by using PLS. We derived the secrecy out-
age probability and achievable ergodic rate at each
network tier and eavesdropper. A tractable approach
was developed to evaluate network-wide SSE and
SEE. Simulation results highlight the impact of
number of antennas at MBS, transmit power, node
density, antenna gains and eavesdroppers density
on secrecy performance. Study has revealed that at
low transmit power operation, secrecy performance
enhances at higher small cell density. We have
found that when node density is high, network-wide
interference elevates that dominates the secrecy per-
formance. Moreover, higher gains at mmWave cells
lead to a drop in secrecy performance thus a tradeoff
exists between better coverage and secrecy. Number
of antennas at MBS cannot be increased beyond
limit as it may lead to deterioration of secrecy
performance of the overall network. Therefore, the
number of antennas at the massive MIMO macro
cells and directivity gains at mmWave cells need
to be carefully analyzed and chosen for secrecy
performance enhancement of the entire network.
APPENDIX A
DETAILED DERIVATION OF ASSOCIATION
PROBABILITY AND PDF OF DISTANCE
Proof of association probability: Using Lemma 3
of [38], we donate k as the tier index with which
legitimate user connects. When Pr,l > Pr,n for n ∈
{1, 2, 3} and n 6= l a typical user associates with lth
tier, i.e. k = l. Therefore,
Al = P[k = l] = ERl
[
P[Pr,l > max
n,n6=l
Pr,n]
]
= ERl
[ 3∏
n=1,n6=l
P[Pr,l > Pr,n]
]
(a)
= ERl
[ 3∏
n=1,n6=l
P
[
Rn >
(
PnGnR
αl
l
PlGl
) 1
αn
]]
=
∫ ∞
0
[ 3∏
n=1,n6=l
P
[
Rn >
(
PnGnR
αl
l
PlGl
) 1
αn
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
]
fRl(x)dx,
(A.1)
where (a) is based on (II-B). The probability
P[Rn >
(
PnGnR
αl
l
PlGl
) 1
αn
] is evaluated using the null
probability for a 2-D PPP given by, exp {−λA},
where λ donates density of PPP in area A.
Ω =
3∏
n=1,n6=l
P[BS no nearer than
(
PnGnx
αl
PlGl
) 1
αn
in nthtier]
=
(
2∏
n=1,n6=l
exp
{− λnpi(Pnxαl
Pl
)
2
αn
})
+exp
{−2piλ3D(x)},
(A.2)
fRl(x) = 2λlpixexp
{−λlpix2} . (A.3)
For the mmWave tier case, let us assume q ∈
{L,N}, R3,q be the distance of typical user to the
closest BS in Φ3,q. Since, transmission power is
same for all links of tier 3 therefore association of
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typical user to Φ3,q is based on link length. Since
mmWave BSs are assumed as independent tiers of
LoS and NLoS BSs therefore,
W (x) = P[Pr,l > Pr,3] = P[Pr,l > P3Gx−αL ]P
[Pr,l > P3Gx
−αN ]
= P
[
x >
(
P3G
Pl
) 1
αL
x
αl
αL
]
P
[
x >
(
P3G
Pl
) 1
αN
x
αl
αN
]
(a)
= exp
{
− 2λ3pi
(
∫ δN (x)
0
tp(t)dt+
∫ δL(x)
0
t(1− p(t))dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
D(x)
)
}
,
(A.4)
where δN(x) =
(
P3G
Pl
) 1
αL x
αl
αL , δL(x) =(
P3G
Pl
) 1
αN x
αl
αN and (a) follows from null probability
with ball centered at origin having radius δN(x) and
δL(x) respectively, and p(t) is the LoS probability
function. Similarly, by substitution of D(x) from
(A.4) and fRl(x) from (A.3) into (A.2), A1, A2 and
A3 can be computed.
Proof of PDF of distance: For any tier k for k ∈
{1, 2, 3}
P[Xk > x] =
P[Rk > x, user associated with tier k]
P[user associated with tier k]
.
P[Xk > x] =
2piλk
∫∞
x
(
xexp
{− pi 2∑
j=1
λj(
Pjx
αk
Pk
)
1
αj
}
+D(x)
)
dx
Ak
Hence, the conditional PDF of distance to serving
BS, given that the user is connected with kth tier,
fXk(x) can be evaluated as
fXk(x) =
d
dx
(1− P[Xk > x]),
with it, PDF of distance for each tier are evaluated.
Association probability per tier is strongly affected
by the transmit power of BSs of each tier, number
of antennas at MBS and small cells BS density.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF LEMMA 1
The average rate, Re1, is calculated as,
Re1 =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
1− P 1so(γe)
1 + γe
dγe, (B.1)
where
P 1so(γe) = Pr(SINR
e
M < γe) = 1− Pr(SINRe1 > γe)
(a)
= 1− EΦ1
[
EΦe
[∏
e∈Φe
(
1− Pr(SINReM > γe)
)]]
(b)
= 1− EΦ1
[
exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
Pr(SINReM > γe)de
]]
,
(B.2)
where (b) gives the upper bound on (a) by using
independence of fading at each eavesdropper and
generating functional of PPP. Taking the integral
expression from (B.2),
=
∞∫
0
Pr
(
Pˆ1he,Mr
−α1
e
σ2 +
∑
j∈Φ1
P1
U
hj,MLj,M(xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IM
+IS
> γe
)
=
∞∫
0
Pr
(
he,M >
γer
α1
e (σ
2 + IM + IS)
Pˆ1
)
(a)
=
N∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
(−1)i+1
∞∫
0
re
(
exp
{− iγerα1e σ2
Pˆ1
})
L(exp{− γerα1e IM
Pˆ1
})L(exp{− γerα1e IS
Pˆ1
})
dre,
(B.3)
where (a) follows from exponential distribution of
he,M , binomial expansion and independence of IM
and IS .
The average achievable ergodic rate at the eaves-
dropper is strongly affected by MBS transmit power
and its distance from MBS. For the macro tier,
LIM (e) = E
[
exp
(
−e
∑
j∈Φ1
P1
U
hj,MLj,M(xj)
)]
(a)
= exp
(
−
∫ ∞
x
(
1− Ehj,M
[
e−e
P1
U
hj,M t
−α1
])
λ12pitdt
)
(b)
= exp
(
−λ12pi
U∑
c=1
(
U
c
)∫ ∞
x
(P1
U
et−α1)c
(1 + P1
U
et−α1)U
tdt
)
,
(B.4)
where the generating functional of PPP is used to
get (a) and binomial expansion to arrive at (b) and
e = exp
{
− γerα1e IM
Pˆ1
}
.
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Similarly, LIS(e) is the Laplace transform of the
PDF of interference from the sub-6 GHz small cell
tier is evaluated as follows
LIS(e) = E
[
exp
(
−e
∑
q∈Φ2
PqhqLq(xq)
)]
= exp
(
−2piλ2
∫ ∞
(
P2U
(N−U+1)Pˆ1
)
1
α2 x
α1
α2
(
eP2t
−α2
1 + eP2t−α2
)
tdt
)
,
(B.5)
where lower limit of integral is the distance between
the typical user and the nearest BS of sub-6 GHz
small cell tier. By substituting (B.4) and (B.5) into
(B.3), the R.H.S of (B.3) can be rewritten as∫
R2
Pr(SINReM > γe) =
N∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
(−1)i+1
∞∫
0
reexp
(
−iγer
α1
e σ
2
Pˆ1
−
ζ11︷ ︸︸ ︷
2piλ1
U∑
c=1
(
U
c
)∫ ∞
x
(P1
U
et−α1)c
(1 + P1
U
et−α1)U
tdt
− 2piλ2
∫ ∞
(
P2U
(N−U+1)Pˆ1
)
1
α2 x
α1
α2
(
eP2t
−α2
1 + eP2t−α2
)
tdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ12
)
dre,
(B.6)
(B.2) can be rewritten as follow:
P 1so(γe) = 1−
EΦ1
[
exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
Pr(SINReM > γe)de
]]
P 1so(γe) = 1−
exp
(
−2piλe
∫
R2
Pr(SINReM > γe)de
)
,
(B.7)
The final expression of (16) is obtained by substi-
tuting the closed form expression of integral from
(B.6) in (B.7) and changing the variables e = u.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF LEMMA 2
The average achievable ergodic rate at the typical
user associated with MBS can be defined as
R1 = E[log2(1 + SINR
u
M)] =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
P 1C(γ)
1 + γ
dγ
=
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
∫∞
0
P 1C(γ, x)fX1(x)dx
1 + γ
dγ
(C.1)
Conditional coverage probability P 1C(γ, x) can be
computed as,
P 1C(γ, x) =
Pr
( P1
U
ho,MLo,M(x)
σ2 +
∑
j∈Φ1\bo,M
P1
U
hj,MLj,M(xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+IS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
> γ
)
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
(
ho,M >
xα1Uγ(σ2 + T )
P1
)
dPr
(I1 ≤ T )
=
∫ ∞
0
e
−xα1Uγ(σ2+T )
P1
N−U∑
j=0
(
xα1Uγ(σ2+T )
P1
)j
j!
dPr
(I1 ≤ T ).
(C.2)
By using change of variables y = xα1 , expanding
the derivative in (C.2) it can be rewritten as
P 1C(γ, x) =
N−U∑
j=0
(xα1)j
j!(−1)j
dj
dyj
[
e
− yUγσ2
P1
LI
(
yUγ
P1
)]
,
(C.3)
where LI(e) is product of Laplace transform of
the PDF of interference from macro tier and sub-6
GHz small cell tier. On combining (B.4) and (B.5),
we get LI(e) = exp(Ξ(e)) given by (15) [24] and
on substituting it in (C.3), using Faa di Bruno’s
formula, we get (14) [24] giving P 1C(γ, x), . By
substituting (C.3) into (C.1), we can calculate the
average achievable ergodic rate at the typical user
associated with MBS which completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF LEMMA 5
The average rate, R3, is calculated as
R3 = E[log2(1 + SINR
u
m)] =
1
ln2
∫ ∞
0
P 3C(γ)
1 + γ
dγ,
(D.1)
and based on thinning theorem, we evaluate the
coverage probability separately for LoS and NLoS
PPPs. Given that user is connected with BS in
Φq3 where q ∈ {L,N}, the conditional coverage
probability is computed as
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P 3,qC (γ) = A3,q
∫ ∞
0
P
[
P3MrMtho,mx
−αq
σ2 + IL + IN
> γ
]
fq(x)dx,
(D.2)
where
A3,L = 2piλ3
∫ ∞
0
xp(x)exp{(−2piλ3M(x)
−Z(x)− Y (x)}
M(x) =
(∫ x
0
tp(t)dt+
∫ x αLαN
0
(1− p(t)) tdt
)
,
Z(x) = piλ1
(
P1(N−U+1)xαL
P3U
)2/α1
and Y (x) =
piλ2
(
P2Uxα1
P1(N−U+1)
)2/α2
A3,N = 1− A1 − A2 − A3,L
are the probabilities of typical user connecting with
LoS or NLoS link.
Here, fN(x) =
2piλ3x(1−p(x))
A3,L
exp{−2piλ3
∫ x
0
t(1 −
p(t))dt+
∫ δN (x)
0
tp(t)dt} is the conditioned PDF of
the distance between the typical user to the NLoS
mmWave BS and fL(x) =
2piλ3xp(x)
A3,N
exp{−2piλ3
∫ x
0
tp(t)dt+
∫ δL(x)
0
t(1− p(t))dt} is the
conditioned PDF of the distance between the typical
user to the LoS mmWave BS [35].
Where IL = P3
∑
i∈ΦL3 \bo,mGlhi,mR
−αL
i and
IN = P3
∑
i∈ΦN3 \bo,mGlhi,mR
−αN
i are the interfer-
ence strengths from LoS and NLoS BSs, respec-
tively. Since we assumed the Nakagami fading
therefore, ho,m is a normalized gamma random
variable with parameter Nq, we obtain the approxi-
mation
= P
[
P3MrMtho,mx
−αq > γ(σ2 + IL + IN)
]
= P
[
ho,m >
xαqγ(σ2 + IL + IN)
P3MrMt
]
(a)
= 1− E
[(
1− exp
(
−ηqx
αqγ(σ2 + IL + IN)
P3MrMt
))Nq]
(b)
=
Nq∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
Nq
j
)
E
[
exp
(
−jηqx
αqγ(σ2 + IL + IN)
P3MrMt
)]
(c)
=
Nq∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
(
Nq
j
)
e−
jηqx
αq γσ2
P3MrMt
EIL
[
e−
jηqx
αq γIL
P3MrMt
]
EIN
[
e−
jηqx
αq γIN
P3MrMt
]
,
(D.3)
where (a) follows from [ [35], Lemma 6] and
ηq = Nq (Nq!)
−
1
Nq , q ∈ {L,N}, (b) from binomial
expansion and (c) from the independence of ΦL3 and
ΦN3 PPPs. Now calculating EIL for q = L we have
= EIL
[
e−
jηLx
αLγ
∑
i∈ΦL3
Glhi,mR
−αL
i
MrMt
]
(d)
= e
−2piλ3
4∑
i=1
pi
∞∫
x
(1−Eg [e−jηLxαLγgaˆit−αL ])p(t)tdt
(e)
=
4∏
i=1
e
−2piλ3pi
∞∫
x
(1−1/(jηLaˆiγ(x/t)αLN−1L )NL )p(t)tdt
,
(D.4)
where (d) is obtained by Laplace transform of ΦL3
[35], g in (d) is a normalized Gamma random vari-
able with parameter NL, aˆi is the gain ai normalized
by MrMt where ai and pi are given by (2) and
(e) is the outcome of computing moment generating
functional of g, respectively.
Likewise, calculation of EIN is similar where
channel gain is the normalized Gamma random
variable with parameter NN . Final expression is
given as
=
4∏
i=1
e
−2piλ3pi
∞∫
δL(x)
(1−1/(jηLaˆiγ(x)αLN−1N t−αN )NN )(1−p(t))tdt
.
(D.5)
Thus we obtain (27) from (D.4) and (D.5) by
combining them using linearity of integrals where
δL(x) = x
αL
αN . For q = N , exactly similar steps are
followed to obtain (28) which are not outlined here
due to the space limitations.
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